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Abstract: The central thesis of this article is that populism is a side 
effect of liberal democracy and a reliable indicator of the relationship 
between liberal democracy and its polar opposite ‒ illiberal 
majoritarianism. As long as liberal democracy prevails over illiberal 
majoritarianism, populism remains dormant. Populism rises and 
becomes conspicuous only if certain manifestations of illiberal 
majoritarianism or illiberal elitism reach a critical point in terms of 
number and impact. More exactly, populism becomes active when there 
are too few reasonable and effective responses to the growth of illiberal 
majoritarianism. Illustrating the defense mechanism of compensation, 
the rise of populism correlates with a cluster of exaggerated or overdone 
reactions to actions inspired by illiberal majoritarianism. These 
reactions vary sharply from one society to another according to (a) the 
specific challenges of illiberal majoritarianism, (b) the reactivity of 
people who bear the liberal democratic values, and (c) the credibility 
enjoyed by the mainstream liberal democratic forces in that society. In 
brief, although illiberal majoritarianism sets off a cluster of populist 
reactions in any society, the rise of populism always takes distinct 
forms. Thus, it is confirmed the status of populism as a chameleonistic 
phenomenon. 
The argumentative thread has four main parts. Firstly, it is 
developed a constitutive model of liberal democracy as an ideal political 
system that is underpinned by the following organizing principles or 
attractors: inclusiveness, political equality, political participation, 
predominance of concurrent majority, the containment and 
predictability of the government power, and the enforcement of the non-
aggression principle. Secondly, the attractors of liberal democracy are 
contrasted against the recent state of affairs in the Euro-Atlantic space 
to illustrate the assertion presented here that today illiberal 
majoritarianism tends to prevail over liberal democracy. In the third 
step, it is argued that the countless definitions of populism only 
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emphasize different symptoms of the rise of populism, depending on the 
particular circumstances in which society evolves. Finally, it is 
substantiated the claim that populism and populists can and should be 
integrated into the democratic political system, in particular into the 
democratic public sphere. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Due to the dualism that “underlies the nature and condition of man” 
(Emerson 1841), any human artifact has a polar opposite and side effects. 
As a rule, these adverse effects worsen when people act on the basis of 
flawed knowledge, harmful desires, foolish goals, and ineffectual means. 
One of the most important human artifacts is government, namely the 
controlling agency intended to protect and preserve society against the 
driving forces of inordinate and destructive passions – whether these are 
assaults from abroad or violent disorders generated from within. The 
existence of government is not a matter of choice, in other words, like 
breathing, it does not depend on our volition. As John C. Calhoun rightly 
pointed out, necessity forces it on all communities in one form or another 
(Calhoun 1851, 8). Given that government per se is good (because it 
makes society possible), it does not follow that all forms of government are 
equally beneficial to any society and at any historical stage. 
When mixed with a liberal way of exerting political power, the 
popular government, also called democracy or the government of the 
people (Calhoun 1851, 29), is generally considered the best form of 
government because it manifests to the least extent the tendency to 
oppression and abuse of power even though it does not (and cannot) annul 
the distinction between the rulers and the ruled. Nevertheless, liberal 
democracy can be nothing else than an imperfect human contrivance. It 
has a tense and changeable relationship with its polar opposite, namely 
illiberal majoritarianism, and a cluster of side effects, including populism.  
Liberal democracy is intrinsically an unstable form of government. 
If deficient in popular support, it leaves room for its polar opposite ‒ 
illiberal majoritarianism ‒ in which the ruling class governs in an absolute 
manner as an unaided numerical majority rather than a concurrent or 
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constitutional majority.1 In general, it can be said that illiberal 
majoritarianism prevails over liberal democracy where politics means 
legal plunder, in that a supposed numerical majority enjoys the privilege 
to politicize its particular interests, large categories of people feel unjustly 
excluded from using political means effectively, and the issues that stay at 
the core of the public agenda are discussed in an atmosphere of 
intolerance. 
The prevalence of illiberal majoritarianism is also indicated by the 
rise of populism. Having a latent presence in the political system when 
liberal democracy is sound and well-balanced, populism gains momentum 
and manifests itself in a multitude of facets when liberal democracy 
begins to decay and the organizing principles of illiberal majoritarianism 
have the power to mold the networks of social relationships. 
The main thesis of my article is that populism is a side effect of 
liberal democracy and a reliable indicator of the relationship between 
liberal democracy and illiberal majoritarianism. Populism itself is not 
something to be avoided, feared, resisted, or eradicated. It exists despite 
our feelings, desires, and commitments. On the other hand, we can and 
must carefully watch the rise or decline of populism in order to estimate 
the vitality of liberal democracy and the advance of illiberal 
majoritarianism, respectively. If the rise of populism has unwanted or 
even unbearable manifestations, the most effective solution is to combat 
the corresponding organizing principles of illiberal majoritarianism, not 
the manifestations of populism themselves. 
In what follows, it will be outlined a constitutive model of liberal 
democracy as a political system based on certain organizing principles or 
attractors: inclusiveness, political equality, political participation, 
predominance of concurrent majority, the containment and predictability 
of the government power, and the enforcement of the non-aggression 
principle. Furthermore, the attractors of liberal democracy will be 
contrasted to the recent state of affairs in the Euro-Atlantic space in order 
to argue that illiberal majoritarianism tends to prevail over liberal 
democracy. The third step will show that the countless definitions of 
populism only emphasize different symptoms of the rise of populism, 
depending on the particular circumstances in which society evolves. 
Finally, the claim that populism and populists can and should be 
                                               
1 The distinction between numerical majority and concurrent majority is clearly 
presented by John Caldwell Calhoun in his posthumous political treatise A Disquisition 
on Government (Calhoun 1851, 28). 
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integrated into the democratic political system, in particular into the 
democratic public sphere, will be substantiated.  
Inasmuch as inclusiveness is a defining trait of democracy, if 
democracy is preferred, all full citizens – including the populists ‒ must 
be encouraged to participate as equals in political life. Acquiring ‒ sine 
ira et studio ‒ valid knowledge about the causes and effects of populism, 
it is possible to find a constructive way to use the political energy of 
populists to the benefit of the whole society. 
 
2. Outlining a constitutive model of liberal democracy 
 
Populism becomes noticeable when the organizing principles of 
liberal democracy lose a great part of their force to shape human 
relationships. Therefore, in order to understand the social phenomenon of 
populism, we should understand the fundamental principles and values of 
liberal (or constitutional) democracy. Liberal democracy by itself is an 
ideal or normative model of government that cannot be found as such in 
any society. As imperfect beings, people are able to imagine a perfect 
form of government but not to build it in real life. Prone to behave selfishly, 
people tend to use all beneficial social institutions for advancing their 
particular interests regardless of the interests of others. Nevertheless, we can 
qualify the political regime of a given society as a liberal democracy if it 
reaches the standards of the ideal model to a sufficient extent. 
The system of liberal democracy is based on specific attractors, in 
other words, on organizing principles or abstract representations that store 
information about the system’s behavior over time (Kiel and Elliot 1996, 
27) and bring regularity to the system (Shaffer 2012, xvii). The mains 
attractors of liberal democracy can be defined by answering the following 
questions: (a) “Who should rule?” and (b) “How should the rulers act?” 
(cf. Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1974, 33). 
The answers to the first question outline the democratic dimension 
of liberal democracy. Roughly speaking, a society would touch the upper 
limit of democracy if it ruled itself by consensus as a self-governing 
society. On the contrary, democracy would reach its nadir if society were 
ruled by an absolutist foreign agency in flagrant contradiction with 
society’s interests. It is self-evident that all human societies are situated 
between the upper and lower limit of democracy. They appear to be more 
and less (un)democratic, depending on (a) the size and structure of the 
endogenous ruling class, and (b) the concordance between rulers’ policies 
and people’s interests. It is also noteworthy that we cannot grade societies 
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by the level of democracy on a cardinal scale. The so-called democracy 
indexes do not and cannot have absolute values. They only allow us to 
order societies on an ordinal scale, so that we could say, for example, that 
Romanian society is more democratic than Mongolian society and less 
democratic than French society. 
Taking into account the contributions of some important 
theoreticians of democracy – like John C. Calhoun (1851), Erik von 
Kuehnelt-Leddihn (1974), Iris Marion Young (2002), and John Gastil 
(2008) –, I correlate democracy with four essential attractors: (a) 
inclusiveness, (b) political participation, (c) political equality, and (d) 
predominance of concurrent majority.  
Firstly, the democratic level of a society is reflected in the size and 
structure of the political body by comparison with the size and structure 
of the whole society. The political body consists of the society’s members 
who possess political rights, especially the rights to vote and to be elected 
to a public office. In the course of history, it has comprised: (a) all adult 
male citizens who served in the army, (b) all adult male citizens who paid 
taxes above a certain level, (c) all adult male citizens, (d) all adult citizens 
without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, sex, language, 
religion or faith, national or social origin, wealth, or any other similar 
criteria, (e) all adult citizens together with their ancestors (in so far as the 
living citizens respect the political options of the past generations 
transmitted by tradition), or (f) all adult citizens and resident non-citizens. 
The more members of a society are included into the political body, the 
more inclusive and – eo ipso – democratic this society is.  
Of course, the analysis of inclusiveness could and should be refined. 
A political system cannot be called “inclusive” just because an increasing 
percentage of society’s members possess the right to vote. Inclusiveness 
also implies an increasing pool of potential candidates (to public offices) 
and a fair representation of vested interests in the ever-changing political 
agenda. Few democracies actually meet these two conditions. There are 
countries categorized as full democracies where, for example, higher 
officials are selected from a relatively small pool of people, who descend 
from certain privileged families, graduate from the same elitist schools, 
belong to the same fraternities or sororities, or share the same particular 
system of values. Most people who enjoy the right of suffrage have in fact 
no chance to be involved in the ruling class as candidates and afterwards 
as higher officials. In regard to inclusiveness of political agenda, it is also 
easy to notice that certain privileged problems and vested interests have a 
privileged place on the public agenda (e.g. same-sex marriage) while 
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other issues and interests are ignored or dismissed (e.g. the over-
indebtedness of households and states).  
Secondly, democracy requires – besides formal inclusion in the 
political body – the real participation of citizens in political life. Above all 
else, political participation implies the exercise of the right to vote 
because the vote is the ultimate political tool in a democratic society. 
People use the vote to give their consent to the democratic political 
system, for legitimizing certain candidates in positions of authority, and 
for ending the deliberations that precede political actions.2 Without high 
turnout, it would be incorrect to say that a political regime instantiates the 
“government of the people, by the people, for the people”. Unfortunately, 
both “mature democracies” and “flawed democracies” have struggled to 
cope with the problem of low turnout in the recent past. 
The exercise of the right to vote is the most important form of 
political participation in a democratic society, but it is not the only one. 
Citizens may engage constructively in various devices of participatory 
democracy – for example citizens’ jury, deliberative opinion pool, 
intercommunity or ethnic-group dialogue –, but they may also resort to 
obstructive political tactics, like civil disobedience, boycott, strike, street 
protest, or riot. In a vigorous and well-balanced democracy citizens are 
actively involved in all forms of political participation to the upper limit 
of their civic virtues (such as abnegation, patriotism, loyalty, and respect), 
civic skills (for example, the capability to dialogue, to work in a team, to 
negotiate, or to build consensus), and civic conduct (such as behaving in a 
civil manner, being fiscally responsible, accepting responsibility for the 
consequence of one’s actions, practicing civil discourse, becoming 
informed on public issues, or providing public service) (cf. Fârte 2009, 
29).  
All these alternatives of political participation do not change the 
special status of the vote as the ultimate ending clause of any dispute on a 
public issue. No other political action – whether constructive or 
destructive – may overturn the result of free voting. 
Thirdly, democracy correlates directly with political equality. 
Political equality is a simple and ingenuous contrivance by the means of 
which people who are very different in terms of physical, intellectual, and 
moral qualities are treated as equal political actors. The abstract equality 
of political actors essentially means equality before the law and equal 
                                               
2 Even in a deliberative democracy deliberations must have an “ending clause”, and the 
supreme ending clause is the vote (cf. Ţuţui 2010, 49). 
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rights of suffrage. This does not exclude noticeable differences with 
regard to the practical opportunities to be elected or to the chances to 
politicize some particular interests effectively. Political equality is an 
ideal that is steadily eroded by the natural tendency of everybody to crush 
his competitors or adversaries and “to live at the expense of everybody 
else” (Bastiat 2011, 99). In every (democratic) society one can notice 
marginalized groups that never enter a majority coalition and whose votes 
do not seem to matter. In order to preserve democracy, political equality 
must be continuously cherished and enforced. 
Finally, democracy requires the predominance of what John 
Calhoun called “the concurrent or constitutional majority” (Calhoun 
1851, 35-38). Above all, it is accepted that a majority constituted by fifty 
percent plus one of an organized collectivity have the “sense of 
community” to a much greater extent than a single person (such as a 
monarch, despot, or dictator) or minority group (such as patricians, 
aristocrats, or technocrats). Having a better sense of community, the 
majority appears to be the most qualified supplier for a community’s 
demands even though it is still a fallible agency that often makes wrong 
decisions. For this reason, people generally admit that neither a single 
person nor a minority, but a majority has the right to impose its decisions on 
the whole collectivity.  
If society were perfectly homogenous, the action of government 
would produce the same effects on each person or group. If any majority 
had pure altruistic feelings, it would selflessly advance society’s interests 
and never pervert its powers into instruments to aggrandize certain 
interests by oppressing and impoverishing the others (Calhoun 1851, 15). 
In fact, every society is made up of different and conflicting interests, and 
every unchecked power ends up oppressing the rest of society. An 
unaided numerical majority can oppress and impoverish the ruled even to 
a much greater extent than an autocratic monarch. Therefore, a well-
balanced democracy needs a concurrent majority, namely a numerical 
majority mixed with the negative power of all conflicting interests. This 
negative power can be exercised by veto, interposition, nullification, 
check, or balance of power and must be able to prevent or arrest the 
oppressive actions of government (Calhoun 1851, 15). Unfortunately, 
most countries do not have a true concurrent majority. Moreover, due to 
chronic low turnout, many countries lack even a numerical majority. Under 
these conditions, to what extent are they democratic? 
Answering the question “How should the rulers act?”, one can 
define the liberal dimension of constitutional democracy. If people prefer 
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democracy mixed with liberalism, they should ask the government to 
maximize society’s degree of freedom. It is an undeniable fact that 
society’s degree of freedom correlates directly with society’s richness, but 
it does not help each member of society to become increasingly 
prosperous. Even if the most destitute persons in a free society live better 
that the poorest persons in an unfree society, relative poverty in free 
societies causes much more grief and resentment than absolute poverty in 
unfree societies. Therefore, people who resent comparative poverty (in 
spite of living in relative comfort) want in fact to maximize their personal 
freedom and not the freedom of the whole society. They prefer democracy 
(in the form of majoritarianism) much more than liberalism. 
The liberal adjuvant of democracy is generated essentially by two 
attractors: (a) the containment and predictability of government power 
and (b) the enforcement of the non-aggression principle. 
As previously mentioned, the fundamental mission of government 
is to protect and preserve society against aggressions from abroad and 
disorders from within. A government’s power to prevent oppression and 
injustice is always and everywhere administered by fallible beings (whose 
individual feelings are stronger than the social ones), therefore it is 
necessary to set clear and firm limits to this tremendous power. If 
unchecked, government invariably transforms itself into the supreme 
aggressor, oppressing instead of protecting the members of society. The 
discussion below will take into consideration only two modalities to 
contain the government power in a liberal democracy. 
Firstly, government power can be limited by law and a written or 
unwritten constitution. In comparison with the force of each person, 
government power is tremendous. Therefore, a government risks 
inflicting pain to any member of society even though it pursues laudable 
goals. It is like a lion coming into contact with a gazelle. The gazelle 
would be exposed to the risk of injury even if the lion were only to play 
with her. Playing its beneficial role in strict conformity with a constitution 
and laws, a government creates a sphere of predictability and safety in 
which human civilization has a good chance to flourish. 
A second device to limit government power is to organize elections 
at periodic intervals so that all key positions in government can be 
contested and the governmental authority peacefully transferred from one 
group of people to another. We cannot talk about full liberal democracy 
where the key positions in government are held in the long run by the 
same group of people. 
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Generally speaking, to enforce the non-aggression principle means 
to forbid, prevent, or punish the proactive use of force in peoples’ own 
sphere. This personal sphere is a conditio sine qua non for living a truly 
human life and includes (a) one’s life and bodily integrity, (b) one’s 
physical, intellectual, and moral faculties, and (c) the tangible and 
intangible goods which persons have acquired by the free exercising of 
their own faculties and capabilities. Thus, it can be truly said that 
someone violates the non-aggression principle if (a’) he takes another 
person’s life or hurts her body, (b’) he enslaves his fellows forcing them 
to use their faculties and capabilities to his own advantage, or (c’) he 
seizes from others by force or fraud any good they have obtained by free 
production or free exchange (cf. Fârte 2015, 100). 
It is worth mentioning that the non-aggression principle does not ask us 
to save our (mature) fellows from cognitive dissonance, emotional distress, or 
loss of reputation. Moreover, to forbid someone from expressing an opinion 
in the public sphere on the grounds that it emotionally hurts other people is a 
direct act of aggression. Nobody deserves the privilege to include his 
idiosyncratic beliefs or feelings in a personal sphere that is governed by the 
non-aggression principle and protected by government. Those people who try 
to build so-called “safe-spaces” free of “microaggressions” (and consequently 
of emotional pain) violate the right of free expression (cf. Ash 2016) and, 
implicitly, the non-aggression principle.  
Another perverse violation of the non-aggression principle happens 
when a government uses its power to enforce certain disputable claim 
rights. If a society reached a very high degree of honesty and solidarity, it 
would be acceptable for its government to guarantee some claim rights 
(for example, the right to education, the right to science and culture, the 
right to affordable healthcare, the right to a living wage, the right to 
retirement, or the right to unemployment benefits) by a partial 
redistribution of income and wealth. Unfortunately, politicians’ 
demagoguery and people’s false sense of entitlement very often transform 
government in “that great fiction through which everybody endeavors to 
live at the expense of everybody else” (Bastiat 2011, 99). Instead of 
increasing the degree of freedom and solidarity, people create a climate of 
reciprocal spoliation that impoverishes and dissocializes them. 
 
3. Liberal democracy versus illiberal majoritarianism 
 
Organized as a dynamic political system by several important 
attractors – inclusiveness, political equality, political participation, 
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predominance of concurrent majority, the containment and predictability 
of the government power, and the enforcement of the non-aggression 
principle –, liberal democracy has proved to be a very fragile artifact. 
Liberal democracy is not a natural result of human evolution and cannot 
subsist without constant nourishment. It comes everywhere under the 
pressure of antidemocratic or illiberal forces that tend to turn it into 
illiberal majoritarianism (or worse).  
Contrary to widespread belief, liberal democracy has fallen into a 
state of decay even in the Euro-Atlantic area. Even here, the organizing 
principles of illiberal majoritarianism have partially taken the place of 
attractors that sustain liberal democracy. In what follows, some arguments 
in favor of this thesis will be presented. 
If the attractors of inclusiveness and political equality are active in a 
society, (a) all vested interests have a fair representation in the political 
sphere, (b) all vested interests have access to the political means once 
they oblige themselves to respect the constitutional pact, (c) all vested 
interests may try to transform any particular problem into a political issue, 
and (d) once transformed into political issues, all issues or interests 
(without exceptions) may be discussed in accordance with the rules of 
public debate. 
The condition of fair representation in the political sphere is 
violated by mainstream parties that impose a biased electoral system in 
order to be over-represented in the decision-making forums. For instance, 
in the United Kingdom general election held on 7
th
 May 2015, Labour 
won 9,347,304 votes and 232 seats in the House of Commons, while 
UKIP won 3,881,011 votes and only one seat (cf. BBC News 2015). This 
means that the vested interests associated with the Labour Party were 
represented at the ratio of 1 seat to 40,406 votes, while the vested interests 
expressed by UKIP were represented at the ratio of 1 seat to 3,881,011 
votes. This disproportion is not just unfair but outrageous. Perhaps a 
cause of BREXIT was the fact that millions of voters became angry with 
a system that marginalizes their views and interests (no matter how 
despicable they may be). 
The condition of free access to the political means is ignored by 
politicians, academics, journalists, pundits and other opinion leaders who 
marginalize and diabolize both certain vested interests and their 
representatives in order to exclude them from the use of government 
power. Being labeled “commies”, “pinkos”, “takers”, “social justice 
warriors”, “snow flakes”, “hate groups”, “populists”, “extremists”, 
“homophobes”, “xenophobes”, “welfare chauvinists”, “sexists”, 
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“fundamentalists”, “racists”, “bigots”, “white supremacists”, etc., they are 
treated as pariahs, that is to say, as people intrinsically unworthy to rule 
their fellows by means of legal coercion. Democracy is not undermined 
by detesting leaders like Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Pablo Iglesias, Donald 
Trump, Nigel Farage, Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen, and Viktor Orbán or 
by criticizing the political programs of their parties, but it is severely 
damaged when some mainstream political groups organize heterogeneous 
coalitions (like the French “republican front”) in order to ban permanently 
such leaders and parties from winning government power. 
Democracy is also impaired by those influential groups who 
arrogate themselves the privilege to politicize all particular issues and 
interests but deny the same possibility to other groups. If all people 
accepted that the only mission of government is to protect citizens from 
aggression, theft, breach of contract, and fraud, public issues would solely 
be alternative ways of enforcing the natural rights to life, liberty and 
property. Such a limited public sphere seems to be unsuitable for 
contemporary democratic societies. After decades of demagoguery and 
generalized legal plunder, people realized that they may politicize any 
problem or interest. So, it is not surprising at all that some vested interests 
have politicized particular issues such as same-sex marriage, the right to 
biological filiation, the sexual right to orgasm, sexual assistance for 
people who cannot afford it, and bathroom access for transgender people. 
On the other hand, it is hard to understand why other people’s main 
concerns about, for example, immigration, religion, crime, welfare 
programs, indebtedness, cronyism, freedom of expression, freedom of 
association are dismissed as outrageous issues that cannot be put on the 
political agenda. 
Finally, the level of inclusiveness and political equality is 
significantly reduced by politicians, academics, journalists, and other 
opinion leaders who break the rules of public debates. Within this context 
it is notably observed that there is a generalized propensity to substitute 
evidence and cogent arguments with insulting labels and venomous 
personal attacks. Publishing the article “Donald Trump as Authoritarian 
Populist: A Frommian Analysis” in the academic journal Logos: a journal 
of modern society and culture (Kellner 2016), Douglas Kellner vividly 
instantiates this deplorable state of affairs: 
 
“In The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973), Fromm engages in a 
detailed analysis of the authoritarian character as sadistic, excessively 
narcissistic, malignantly aggressive, vengeably destructive, and 
necrophiliac, personality traits arguably applicable to Trump. […] Trump 
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clearly exhibits traits of the sadist […]. Trump is one of the most 
narcissistic figures to appear in recent U.S. politics. […] Trump’s attitudes 
and behavior toward women exhibit traits of Fromm’s malignant 
aggression, as well as blatant sexism. […] Trump’s need for adoration and 
his malignant and destructive rage at all criticism and opposition shows an 
extremely disordered personality who constitutes a grave danger to the 
United States and the world. The necrophilic personality fills his 
emptiness with sadism, aggression, amassing wealth and power, and is 
prone to violence and self-destruction.” 
 
If academics think and write in this way, what about people who are 
less cultivated and much more prone to be inflamed by inordinate and 
destructive passions? Without civilized debates, democracy fades away 
and political competition degenerates into riots and civil wars.  
The attractors of political participation and concurrent majority 
form the crux of democracy. They correlate with three essential 
conditions: (a) most members of the political body exercise their right to 
suffrage, (b) the party that wins the majority of votes exerts political 
power, and (c) minorities have such a constitutional power to resist that 
the majority party usually takes into consideration their interests.  
The first condition is contradicted by the trend of declining turnout 
in many Euro-Atlantic countries. For example, turnout dipped to 42.54% 
at the May 2014 EU election (cf. Euractiv, 2014), 55% in the USA 
presidential election of 2016 (cf. Wallace, 2017), 42.64% in the second 
tour of the legislative elections in France of 18
th
 June 2017 (cf. France 
Info, 2017), and 39.48% at the legislative elections in Romania of 11
th
 
December 2016. (cf. Realitatea.net, 2016). Having such low voter 
engagement, it is normal for everyone to express doubts about 
parliaments’ democratic legitimacy and higher officials’ credibility. 
When voter turnout is around 50%, it is impossible to demonstrate 
that the winning party represents the majority of society or, at least, the 
majority of the political body. If majority rule does not apply in the most 
important context, namely when people entrust their sovereignty to their 
representatives, democracy reaches a dangerous low level. Properly 
speaking, such a flawed political system can be called neither 
“democracy” nor “majoritarianism”.  
Democratic deficit is aggravated by another two factors, namely the 
emergence of technocratic governments and the virulence of some 
pressure groups. Over the last several years it has been possible to note 
that governments led by technocrats – for example, Jan Fischer’s Cabinet 
(Czech Republic, 2009-2010) and the Cabinet of Lucas Papademos 
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(Greece, 2011-2012) – or composed mostly of technocrats ‒ such as 
Mario Monti’s Cabinet (Italy, 2011-2013), Plamen Oresharski’s Cabinet 
(Bulgaria, 2013-2014), and the Cabinet of Dacian Ciolos (Romania, 
2015-2017) ‒ exerted political power without an explicit electoral 
mandate. As a rule, people became angry with such cabinets even if they 
seemed qualified to solve certain ticklish economic problems. The most 
probable reason for this rejection reaction could be the people’s 
perception that technocratic cabinets are exogenous political agencies and 
act as such. 
The second threat to democracy is posed by pressure groups that 
seek to influence government policy or legislation without taking a 
correlative responsibility. As mentioned before, political participation in a 
sound democracy is not confined to casting a vote at regular intervals. 
There is no vacuum in the political life of society. Besides exerting the 
right of suffrage, people permanently perform either constructive or 
obstructive political actions. However, the particular political actions of 
the pressure groups should never have precedence over electoral 
participation because the results of the vote indicate in the most clear way 
society’s general will. For example, the “Resist” movements oriented 
against the president Donald Trump may not annul the result of the USA 
presidential election of 2016, no matter how many furious people rally 
around. Assuming that Donald Trump respects the law, he should remain 
the president of the United States until the next presidential election. If 
people are becoming used to challenging the result of an election, they 
will come to challenge the results of all elections. Under such 
circumstances, there would be no peaceful ending clause of social 
conflicts and no antidote to civil discords. 
Social peace and democracy are also threatened by the fact that 
certain social groups consider themselves unable to advance their interests 
using political means. More exactly, they feel that there is no 
constitutional instrument at hand to resist the majority party or ‒ more 
important ‒ to take a stand against a privileged minority that acts with the 
boldness of a concurrent majority. For example, the recent waves of 
immigrants from the Middle East and Africa to Europe put the European 
Union’s executive in opposition to some local communities because the 
European officials wanted to force them to accept a quota of asylum-
seekers. The most important aspect of this conflict has nothing to do with 
the moral traits of the people who refused to accept immigrants. It does 
not matter whether these people are in fact selfish, stingy, callous, 
xenophobes, or Islamophobes because no political agency may 
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democratically use government power to enforce certain high moral 
standards. The real problem is whether a local community backed by 
public opinion can resist a superior political agency (which lacks similar 
electoral support).  
The thesis that at the present time the liberal attractors fade away 
may seem counterintuitive. Nobody can deny that our society is animated 
by social emancipatory movements as never before in human history. 
Myriads of politicians, activists, academics, journalists, Hollywood stars, 
and other opinion leaders are actively involved themselves in various 
branches of progressivism ‒ feminism, anti-racism, anti-colonialism, 
interculturalism, multiculturalism, LGBT rights, disability rights, etc. ‒ in 
order to discover new marginalized minorities or oppressed groups and 
promote their rights. It is a matter of fact that large categories of people 
overcame their reluctance to face up to those minorities’ problems, needs, 
or claims and are favorably disposed to accept government intervention in 
this domain. Former marginalized minorities or oppressed groups can see 
today that their problems and claims are placed firmly on the public 
agenda and their particular rights legally enforced. 
However, there is a reverse side of this positive state of affairs. Too 
often activists ignore the complex network of human relationships and 
pursue their laudable goals in a ruthless manner. They did not adapt the 
rhythm and means of the intended reforms to the current reality so that the 
sweeping changes could be assimilated organically into the fabric of 
society. Moreover, some of them unfairly dismiss their opponents’ 
concerns, needs, or views and do not hesitate to break the non-aggression 
principle in order to crush resisters. Of course it is not a crime for 
anybody to detest their opponents, but it is illiberal for any attempt to 
destroy their reputation by using derogatory epithets, like “basket of 
deplorables”, “racists”, “misogynists”, “Islamophobes”, “bigots”,  or 
“homophobes”.3 
The illiberal attitude of some progressivists has even more grievous 
manifestations. Although many so-called progressivists prove themselves 
to be scoffers and facile critics, they are very sensitive to criticism no 
matter how good the counterarguments are. For them, all people who 
contradict claims related to same-sex marriage, welfare programs, 
                                               
3 In 2016 The Huffington Post posted several months in a row the following disparaging 
disclaimer: “Donald Trump is a serial liar, rampant xenophobe, racist, birther and bully 
who has repeatedly pledged to ban all Muslims – 1.6 billion members of an entire religion 
– from entering the U.S.” The intention to damage Trump’s reputation is obvious. 
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abortion, or affirmative action, for example, are hatred-driven persons4 
(that is homophobes, welfare chauvinists, sexists, racists, etc.) who may 
and must be silenced. For example, in March 2017, a debate was planned 
about political correctness and free speech in academia at MacMaster 
University. Jordan Peterson, a psychology professor at the University of 
Toronto, was one of the guest speakers. He became a “controversial 
figure” because he had refused to use genderless pronouns. Professor 
Peterson was prevented from giving his talk by a group of student 
activists who shouted him down. They defended themselves against the 
accusation of censorship stating that “[t]he concept of freedom of speech 
has most often been mobilized to protect specifically counter-hegemonic 
ideas, ideas that actually challenge, rather than reiterate, the status quo.” 
(cf. Beatty 2017) This argument is evidently flawed because the authors 
of the statement ‒ assuming a very illiberal perspective ‒ confused rights 
with privileges. A proper right cannot be granted to someone if it is not 
granted in principle to everyone. If freedom of speech is treated as a 
special right, advantage, or immunity granted or available only to a 
particular person or group (namely to the people who challenge the status 
quo), it becomes a privilege. 
 
4. The prevalence of illiberal majoritarianism 
    and the rise of populism 
 
This thesis has so far presented the dialectic relationship between 
liberal democracy and its polar opposite ‒ illiberal majoritarianism ‒ 
following the main effects of their organizing principles. It has been 
argued that there is a mounting inner tension in Euro-Atlantic political 
systems that is reaching a critical threshold. More exactly, the recent state 
of affairs has been invoked in order to substantiate the claim that today 
illiberal majoritarianism tends to prevail over liberal democracy. The 
prevalence of illiberal majoritarianism is suggested especially by the 
frequent infringements of the right to freedom of speech. An increasing 
number of issues which stay on the public agenda are discussed in a 
hostile, illiberal climate due to the fact that many people have arrogated to 
themselves the privilege of silencing others without any moral or legal 
ground. It is now time to discuss the rise of populism as an effect 
produced by the prevalence of illiberal majoritarianism. 
                                               
4 As a matter of fact, no polite and reasoned criticism of a thesis is per se a token of 
hatred even if the counterarguments invoked are flawed. 
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As previously mentioned, populism is a side effect of liberal 
democracy. As long as liberal democracy prevails over its polar opposite 
‒ illiberal majoritarianism ‒, populism remains latent, and very few 
people could pay attention to it. Populism rises and becomes conspicuous 
only after some manifestations of illiberal majoritarianism or (even 
worse) illiberal elitism reach a critical point in terms of number and 
impact. In fact, “active” or “conspicuous” populism includes caricatural 
reactions of liberal democracy to the action inspired by illiberal 
majoritarianism. These caricatural reactions correspond essentially to the 
attractors of liberal democracy, but they are exaggerated or overdone and, 
therefore, somewhat ludicrous and even grotesque. Perhaps this 
exaggeration appears where there are too few reasonable and effective 
responses to the growing illiberal majoritarianism. 
By treating populism as a latent side effect of liberal democracy and 
the rise of populism as an overdone and (at least in part) caricatural 
reaction to illiberal majoritarianism, it is possible to develop an 
integrative approach to populism that does not invalidate but rather put 
together many of the existing definitions, descriptions, and explanations.  
The most difficult step in defining a concept like “populism” is to 
find the proximate genus, in other words, “the next above it in the series”. 
Inasmuch as populism is an elusive and “chameleonistic” phenomenon 
(Rooduijn et al. 2014, 564), it is no wonder that theoreticians include in 
their definitions very different proximate genera. Thus, it is said that 
populism is a “form of illiberal democracy” (Mudde 2017b), a 
“philosophy”, more exactly, a “loose set of ideas” (Inglehart and Norris 
2016), a “(thin-centered) ideology” (Mudde 2004), a “discursive frame” 
(Aslanidis 2016), a “property of a message” (Rooduijn et al. 2014), a 
“mode of political practice” and a “flexible way of animating political 
support” (Jansen 2011), a “political practice” or “style of politics” 
(Wolkenstein 2015), an “illiberal democratic response to undemocratic 
liberalism” (Mudde 2017a), or an “irrational response to economic 
change” (cf. Jansen 2011). This great variety of proximate genera suggest 
that populism is not a well-circumscribed and stable entity. As side effect 
of liberal democracy, populism is a latent entity void of actual properties. 
As such it cannot be analyzed. Populism acquires content only if it rises 
sufficiently and forms a cluster of reactions to the challenges of illiberal 
majoritarianism. But these reactions vary sharply from one society to 
another according to (a) the specific challenges of illiberal 
majoritarianism, (b) the reactivity of people who bear liberal democratic 
values, and (c) the credibility enjoyed by mainstream liberal democratic 
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forces. In brief, although populism is everywhere a cluster of reactions, it 
always takes very different forms confirming its status as a 
chameleonistic phenomenon. 
The rise of populism spread populistness ‒ to a greater or lesser 
extent ‒ in myriads of persons, groups, organizations, institutions, 
messages, spontaneous behaviors, actions, or events. For example, within 
the Euro-Atlantic area we could easily notice the trait of populistness in 
some political leaders (Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, Geert Wilders, 
Marine Le Pen, and Viktor Orbán), political parties (The National Front 
in France, The Party for Freedom in The Netherlands, The UK 
Independence Party in the United Kingdom, Sweden Democrats in 
Sweden, Podemos/ We Can in Spain, and Syriza/ The Coalition of the 
Radical Left in Greece), socio-political movements (the 15-M Movement 
in Spain, Occupy Wall Street, Safe-space, Black Lives Matter, and the 
Tea Party in the USA,), electoral programs (e.g. Marine Le Pen’s 
presidential platform “144 presidential commitments. Marine 2017”), 
political messages (e.g. the electoral slogan “Make America Great Again” 
or the tweet “We will BUILD THE WALL”), and political measures (e.g. 
Donald Trump’s executive order by which citizens of seven Muslim-
majority countries were barred from entering the US for at least 90 days). 
Of course, none of the above-mentioned examples epitomize populismus 
in proportion of one hundred per cent. Nobody and nothing is absolutely 
populist. The presence of populistness in any bearer is a matter of degree.  
Both illiberal antidemocratic challenges and the reactions to them 
differ significantly from one society to another (and from time to time), 
therefore it is improbable to find populistness epitomized in well-
articulated ideological systems. On the other hand, populism has remained 
latent until now in other Euro-Atlantic countries (for example, Romania) 
although the population has had to face illiberal majoritarian challenges.5 
Perhaps the shortness of democratic tradition and the disposition to bear 
abuses explain the latency of populism in these countries. 
Caused very often by temporary factors, the rise of populism has 
many ephemeral manifestations. For example, the UK’s retreat from the 
European Union gave satisfaction to UKIP’s electorate but reduced the 
advance of the corresponding populist party. While at the general election 
held in May 2015, UKIP won 3,881,011 votes and one seat in the House 
of Commons, at the 2017 general election UKIP gained only 594,068 
                                               
5 A diffuse presence of populism could be present everywhere. Someone could find a 
trace of populistness even in this article. 
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votes and no seat in the House of Commons (cf. BBC News 2017). The 
reactive nature of populism means that every populists’ success is 
followed by a serious setback. 
Given that the rise of populism always correlates with a cluster of 
reactions and these reactions are necessarily different from one country to 
another, it would be useful to know why certain “populist traits” are more 
conspicuous in a country than in another. 
According to Cas Mudde, populists consider society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the 
pure people” versus “the corrupt elite” and genuine politics an expression 
of the general will of the people (Mudde 2004, 543). Cas Mudde’s 
consideration appears to cover all countries where the rise of populism is 
conspicuous. For example, Mudde’s definition seems to be illustrated by 
Donald Trump, who used the slogan “Drain the swamp” during his 
presidential campaign.6 However, Donald Trump cannot be considered 
populist just because he utilized an anti-corruption slogan. The anti-
corruption discourse is not confined to the populist rhetoric. It is used in a 
recurrent manner by all parties, including the mainstream ones. 
In fact, Donald Trump proved to be populist because he 
underscored the everlasting antagonism between the rulers and the ruled 
(not just between the elite and the masses), knowing the fact that populists 
feel themselves closely associated with the ruled. In democracy, these two 
classes are neither homogenous nor immutable. For example, the 
democratic ruling class is a mixture of voters and elected officials and 
includes very different categories, even groups that are usually treated as 
weak and vulnerable: academics, journalists, farmers, the unionized 
workers, women, racial minorities, ethnic minorities, sexual minorities, 
the disabled, welfare recipients, (illegal) immigrants, religious 
organizations, and activists.7 Thus, populists notice that the rulers are not 
necessarily superior in terms of wealth, status, intellectual competences, 
or moral virtues but have the privilege to politicize any personal problem 
or interest. In their opinion, the rulers receive undeserved benefits by 
                                               
6 Trump promised to clean up Washington, D.C. by imposing “a five-year lobbying ban 
on senators, representatives and top staffers” (Overby 2017). 
7 Investigating the possible predictors of voting support for populist parties, Ronald F. 
Inglehart and Pippa Norris found that “[p]opulists [...] received significantly less support 
(not more) among sectors dependent on social welfare benefits as their main source of 
household income and among those living in urban areas. (Inglehart & Norris 2016, 4). 
Although poor, welfare recipients have common interests with the ruling class, not with 
the ruled. 
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means of lawful coercion while they can earn a livelihood only through 
work and free transactions. Under these circumstances, people who feel 
marginalized and are represented by diabolized leaders and marginalized 
parties put the following question: “Why they, why not we?” The rhetoric 
based on antagonism between the rulers and the ruled can be effective in 
heterogeneous societies where large categories of people could feel that 
their votes do not matter, but it fails to animate the populists in 
homogenous societies like Denmark, Norway, or Sweden. 
The opinion that populism presents a “Manichean outlook”, in 
which there are only friends and foes” and no compromise is possible 
(Mudde 2004, 544) is contradicted by the fact that populist parties were 
ready for compromise and enter government when such offers are made. 
Because of critics in the mass media, the mainstream parties are more 
reluctant than so-called populist parties to form a governmental coalition. 
It is an undeniable fact that people who share “black and white views” 
build a polarized society (Mudde 2017), but the virulent critics of 
populists share a great part of responsibility in polarizing society. 
It is also said that “[p]opulism favors mono-culturalism over 
multiculturalism, national self-interest over international cooperation and 
development aid, closed borders over the free flow of peoples, ideas, 
labor and capital, and traditionalism over progressive and liberal social 
values” (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 7). Confirmed grosso modo by 
reality, this observation needs some clarifications. It is obvious that such 
populist reactions could appear only in globalized societies that have to 
cope with large inflows and outflows of people, goods, or money. As with 
any change in human history, globalization creates winners and losers. 
Populists distrust the collateral effects of globalization (such as 
multiculturalism, the free flow of peoples, ideas, labor and capital, and 
open borders) because they already lost (at least in part) their jobs, 
prosperity, and way of life without receiving something valuable instead. 
In addition to their distress, they have to cope with the hostility and public 
disdain of mainstream opinion leaders. 
If the benefits of globalization surpassed its perceived costs, the 
populists would surely adopt a cosmopolitan attitude. For example, 
Romanian people are more supportive of the European Union than many 
Western European countries mainly because they realize that their future 
is brighter in the EU. Therefore, instead of criticizing populists for their 
defensive attitude towards globalization, politicians, academics, 
journalists, and other opinion leaders should help them to express their 
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concerns in the public sphere and to find a political solution within the 
liberal democratic system. 
The last populist trait discussed in this context is that populists 
prefer charismatic leaders who provide simple solution to complex 
problems (Dzurinda 2016, 171). Like in the case of supposed antagonism 
between “the corrupt elite” and “the pure people”, we do not have to do 
with a characteristic trait of (active) populism. It is not just populist 
parties, but all parties that strive to present charismatic leaders before 
their voters. The new president of France, Emmanuel Macron, won the 
electoral contest against Marine Le Pen as a charismatic leader equipped 
with all the corresponding qualities. Who could dare to say that 
Emmanuel Macron is a populist politician? On the other hand, it is not 
true that populists want simple solutions to complex problem because 
they rarely take into consideration such issues. As mentioned before, 
populists are anxious, defensive, and reactive. Populists tend to mobilize 
themselves only if they have to cope with individual issues that directly 
affect their lives.  
 
 
5. Final remarks:  
    Let’s accept reasoned populist stances in the public sphere 
 
In conclusion, as a side effect of liberal democracy and reliable 
indicator of the relationship between liberal democracy and its polar 
opposite ‒ illiberal majoritarianism ‒, populism cannot be eradicated. 
However, it is possible and recommendable to monitor the overdone 
reactions associated with the rise of populism in order to prevent or 
contain those manifestations that could cause major upheavals in society.  
The worst possible way to combat the rise of populism is to 
diabolize or marginalize the most conspicuous bearers of populistness and 
to get rid of (as harmful) all their messages or actions from the public 
sphere. No populist is so powerful to rise populism by himself. If 
populism rises, there are enough supraindividual factors that sustain it. 
These factors belong in large part to the prevalence of illiberal 
majoritarianism. 
We should accept that it is possible to contain certain exaggerated 
reactions caused by active populism if the main attractors of liberal 
democracy ‒ inclusiveness, political equality, political participation, 
predominance of concurrent majority, the containment and predictability 
of the government power, and the enforcement of the non-aggression 
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principle ‒ are enforced with renewed vigor. Above all, it is necessary to 
enforce inclusiveness in regard to populists treating them as equal 
partners in the political sphere. We should accept that it is possible for 
populists to feel a deep sense of frustration because they perceive a wide 
gap between them and certain “privileged minorities” that may affirm 
their particular identities, can easily politicize their specific problems or 
interests, and are able to use political means effectively. 
The inclusiveness in regard to populists has a peculiar importance in 
the sphere of democratic public debates. Populists could and should be 
invited as equal partners, and all participants ‒ populists or not ‒ should 
oblige themselves to follow the minimal rules of public debates: (1) Do 
not label your opponent; (2) Do not make malicious speculations about 
your opponents; (3) Do not seek your opponent’s interests or motives for 
holding his claims; (4) Do not invoke the character, temperament and 
personality traits of your opponent; (5) Provide relevant evidence for your 
claims; and (6) Stay focused on the issue discussed. Known as loci 
communes in the sphere of (civilized) public debates, these rules provide a 
good starting point for a necessary reconciliation between populists and 
their adversaries. 
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